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Civic Education and Democratic Backsliding in the
Wake of Kenya’s Post-2007 Election Violence
Steven E. Finkel University of Pittsburgh
Jeremy Horowitz Dartmouth College
Reynaldo T. Rojo-Mendoza University of Pittsburgh
This article examines two unexplored questions concerning the impact of civic education programs in emerging
democracies: (1) whether such programs have longer-terms effects and (2) whether civic education can be effective
under conditions of democratic ‘‘backsliding.’’ We investigate these questions in the context of a large-scale civic
education program in Kenya just before the disputed 2007 election that sparked a wave of ethnic clashes and
brought the country to the brink of civil war. Analysis of a survey of 1,800 ‘‘treatment’’ and 1,800 ‘‘control’’
individuals shows that the program had significant long-term effects on variables related to civic competence and
engagement, with less consistent effects on democratic values. We also find that participants who subsequently were
affected by the violence were less likely to adopt negative beliefs about Kenya’s political system, less likely to support
the use of ethnic or political violence, and more likely to forgive those responsible for the post-election violence.
I
t is a truism that democracy works better when
citizens possess attitudes and values that are con-
ducive to multiparty politics and where citizens are
engaged in the political process. Belief in this truism
among international donors has inspired a wide range
of policies and programs designed to further mass
democratic culture around the world. Civic education
programs, in particular, have emerged as a core com-
ponent of efforts by the United States and other
Western countries to aid the consolidation of demo-
cratic practices in emerging democracies. While little
data is available on the extent of such efforts, one recent
study estimated that the main U.S. donor, the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID),
alone spent between 35 and 50 million dollars per year
on civic education worldwide from 1990 to 2005
(Finkel and Smith 2011).
Can donor-sponsored civic education programs
work in emerging democracies? Recent evaluations
among both school-age children and adults in a variety
of new democratic settings offer some evidence that
such programs can be effective (Bratton et al. 1999;
Finkel 2002, 2003; Finkel and Smith 2011; Torney-
Purta et al. 2001). Yet important questions remain. In
this article, we present the findings of an evaluation
of a national civic education program implemented
in Kenya between 2006 and 2007.1 We seek to
contribute to the literature in two specific ways. First,
we ask whether civic education has longer-term effects.
Most prior research has relied on surveys that were
conducted shortly after the programs ended, making it
impossible to determine whether the observed effects
were transitory or more enduring. For reasons ex-
plained below, we were forced to delay our examina-
tion of Kenya’s civic education program until nearly a
year after it had ended. While this created a number of
logistical challenges, it also provided an opportunity to
examine the longer-term effects of the program.
Second, this study seeks to understand whether civic
education programs can work in countries experienc-
ing democratic reversals. Nearly all existing studies of
civic education programs have been conducted in
countries that were on a positive trajectory, such as
the Dominican Republic, Zambia, Poland, and South
Africa in the mid-to-late 1990s, or Kenya at the time of
its democratic breakthrough election of 2002. It may be
that civic education has greater effects in countries that
are on the road to consolidation, where citizens may be
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particularly receptive to civic education interventions.
Less is known about the potential contribution of civic
education in settings like Kenya during the elections of
2007, where the consolidation of democracy was
challenged by intense ethnic political mobilization,
widespread violence, and electoral fraud.
We explore these questions through an examina-
tion of the Second Kenya National Civic Education
Programme (NCEP II-Uraia), a large-scale civic edu-
cation program carried out in Kenya during the run-up
to the 2007 elections. Our data come from a 2008
survey of 1,800 individuals who attended at least one
NCEP II-Uraia civic education event and 1,800 similar
nonattendees. Our methods, as will be discussed in
detail below, control in a variety of ways for possible
biases stemming from the self-selected nature of
NCEP II-Uraia civic education exposure.
Three main findings emerge from this study.
First, in line with previous research, we find that the
program had the most consistent long-term effects on
a set of variables related to ‘‘civic competence and
engagement’’—e.g., political knowledge, rights aware-
ness, efficacy, and participation. It was, however,
significantly less effective on influencing most core
democratic values and orientations. Second, the
program nevertheless had positive effects on some var-
iables related to ethnic tolerance and on support for the
peaceful resolution of ethnic and political conflict, a
key concern in Kenya’s multiethnic democracy and
especially important in the aftermath of the widespread
violence that followed the 2007 elections. Third, we
find that the program played some role in mitigating
the negative impacts of the post-election violence itself.
The direct experience of post-election violence did
much to undermine individuals’ faith in Kenyan
democracy and their role in it, but these negative
effects were attenuated among those who had been
exposed to NCEP II-Uraia civic education. To this
extent, the program was successful in preventing even
more disillusionment and democratic backsliding as a
result of the events that occurred in Kenya after the
program had formally concluded.
Civic Education in Emerging
Democracies: Unanswered Questions
Donor-sponsored civic education programs in emerg-
ing democracies are typically designed to promote a
bundle of norms, values, and behaviors thought to be
conducive to democratic politics. While the goals and
methods vary across countries, civic education pro-
grams generally seek to provide citizens with knowl-
edge about how the political process works, to
encourage active participation, and to instill values
such as tolerance and support for individual liberties.
Civic education programs typically work through
some mix of school-based initiatives geared toward
students, community-based activities (workshops,
meetings, village theater, etc.) aimed at adults, and in
some case, media campaigns as well.
While few quantitative studies have been con-
ducted, the consensus within the existing literature is
that civic education can be effective, especially on
variables related to knowledge, participation, and
civic engagement. On participation, for example,
Finkel (2003) found that programs implemented in
three disparate settings—the Dominican Republic,
Poland, and South Africa—increased citizen partic-
ipation in local politics by a significant margin. Exist-
ing studies, however, have found that civic education
programs generally have more limited effects on citizen
orientations, such as political tolerance or institutional
trust, though some modest effects have been docu-
mented (Bratton et al. 1999; Finkel 2003; Finkel and
Smith 2011).
While the existing literature provides some evi-
dence that civic education programs of various types
can be effective, a number of questions remain. In
this study we focus on two issues. First, we ask
whether civic education has longer-term effects or
whether its effects are more ephemeral. There is good
reason to suspect that civic education might have
minimal longer-term impact. Much of the existing
literature on political culture suggests that attitudes
and dispositions ought to change very slowly and
mainly in response to large-scale trends in countries’
economic, political, and social structures (e.g.,
Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).
If these accounts are correct, we should expect that
while civic education might have positive short-term
effects, such programs will be less likely to produce
deeper effects that will be sustained over time.
Moreover, nearly all existing studies of civic educa-
tion look for effects relatively shortly after the
programs have ended. Less is known about whether
effects endure or whether citizens return to their
prior predispositions and orientations over time.
A second question relates to the potential im-
portance of contextual factors. While civic education
programs have been implemented in many different
types of settings, nearly all existing evaluations come
from countries that were on a positive trajectory at
the time of the research. Finkel and Smith (2011, pp.
418–419), for example, characterized Kenya in 2002
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as a context where ‘‘there was real hope that true
democratic change in the country was possible,’’ so
that the civic education that took place at that time
‘‘had at least some chance of building successfully on
recent democratic developments.’’ It may be hy-
pothesized that citizens are most willing to adopt
new attitudes and behaviors in settings where oppor-
tunities for political engagement are expanding and
where the messages from civic education reinforce
positive experiences with democratic change. On the
other hand, the earliest studies of civic education
found that greater effects among students were seen
when civic education messages were ‘‘nonredundant’’
to the democratic messages that young adults may
have heard in their family and friendship circles
(Langton and Jennings 1968). To this extent, it may
be the case that civic education is even more effective
in less democratic contexts or in countries experienc-
ing violence or other kinds of democratic reversals.
Without evidence from civic education evaluations in
more authoritarian, or ‘‘backsliding’’ contexts, we
simply do not know which of these processes is more
prevalent.
The Second Kenya National
Civic Education Program
(NCEP II-Uraia)
We examine these issues through an evaluation of the
second round of Kenya’s National Civic Education
Program (NCEP II), which ran from April 2006 to
September 2007. NCEP II, which was funded by a
basket of European donors, sought to build on the
lessons of a prior civic education program (NCEP I),
which was conducted in Kenya from 2001 to 2002
(Finkel and Smith 2011). The program took the name
‘‘Uraia,’’ meaning ‘‘citizenship’’ in Kiswahili. The
program was implemented by 43 Kenyan civil society
and religious institutions organized into four larger
consortia. These organizations conducted a wide
variety of activities, including workshops, village
theater performances, informal meetings in churches
and mosques, cultural gatherings, and other public
events. Records collected by the Program (which we
later used for sampling purposes) show that approx-
imately 79,000 unique events were held. The program
also funded a media campaign that included tele-
vision, radio, and newspaper. While it is not possible
to determine the number of people reached by the
program with certainty, we estimate that the program
reached between 4.5 and 5.5 million individuals
through its face-to-face components (roughly 21%
to 26% of the adult population).2
The program was designed around five key
themes: (1) nation building, (2) democracy, (3) good
governance, (4) constitutionalism, and (5) human
rights. The activities conducted under the NCEP II
rubric sought to increase individuals’ level of aware-
ness and knowledge of these five thematic areas, as
well as to cultivate the skills, values, and dispositions
that would facilitate effective citizen participation,
that would serve to hold political elites accountable,
and that would enable individuals to assert and
defend their political and human rights against
possible encroachment by the state or other members
of Kenyan society.3 NCEP II also addressed many
Kenya-specific issues, such as the on-going constitu-
tional review process, ethnic and religious tension,
and three ‘‘cross-cutting issues’’—HIV/AIDS, gender,
and environmental concerns.
NCEP II was implemented in the context of a
highly polarized political system. The country’s pres-
ident, Mwai Kibaki, had come to power in 2002 in an
election that was widely viewed as a major step toward
the consolidation of democracy (Ndegwa 2003). The
election marked the first transfer of power from one
party to another in the country’s history. Prior to the
2002 election, the country’s dominant party, KANU,
had maintained its rule through a mix of heavy-
handed tactics, electoral fraud, and ethnic mobiliza-
tion. Kibaki came to power at the head of a highly
diverse, multiethnic coalition, promising to bring an
end to the corruption, incompetence, and ethnic
favoritism that had become endemic to Kenyan poli-
tics. Yet, within a short time of taking office, Kibaki’s
administration become embroiled in a series of major
scandals that raised doubts about the president’s
commitment to reform. Moreover, Kibaki’s reliance
on a close circle of advisors drawn mainly from his
home ethnic region led many to conclude that ethnic
favoritism remained deeply entrenched in his admin-
istration (Barkan 2008). Tensions between different
factions in the Kibaki government came to a head in
a 2005 referendum on constitutional change. Many
of Kibaki’s 2002 coalition allies openly campaigned
2This estimate is based on the total figure of 10 million
individuals trained, as reported in program documents, dis-
counted by the level of multiple exposures to program events
reported by participants in our survey. The United Nations
estimated that in 2006 there were approximately 39 million
Kenyans and that 54% of these were adults (16+). Source: World
Bank Development Indicators.
3These goals are explicitly laid out in the program document
Kenya’s National Civic Education Programme: The Uraia Manual,
available at http://www.uraia.or.ke/english/.
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against the referendum, which was supported by the
president. The campaigns devolved into a hostile contest
in which ethnic communities lined up on opposing sides
of the issue, and leaders employed divisive ethnic
messages to rally their supporters. The referendum,
which failed by a wide margin, left the country deeply
polarized along partisan and ethnic lines. Given this
context, one of the core goals of NCEP II-Uraia was to
encourage ethnic tolerance during the 2007 election.
The 2007 election proved to be a highly conten-
tious race that brought long-standing communal
grievances over economic and political inequalities to
the fore. As in the 2005 referendum, the 2007 election
was filled with divisive ethnic appeals that played on
and exacerbated resentments and hostilities between
ethnic communities (Horowitz 2011). Disputes over
the outcome of the election, which was widely
believed to have been stolen by the incumbent party,
sparked a wave of ethnic violence in which more than
1,000 people were killed and at least 300,000 more
were displaced from their homes (Anderson and
Lochery 2008). The post-election violence, which
engulfed large sections of Kenya’s Rift Valley and the
capital city Nairobi, lasted over two months until a
power-sharing agreement was reached in late February
2008 by the main political parties. Our survey, as well
as national survey data collected by the Afrobarometer
in late-2008, showed that at least a quarter of the
Kenyan population was directly affected in one way or
another by the conflict.4 The post-election violence
revealed both the tenuousness of Kenya’s progress
toward democratic consolidation and the depth of
ethnic and partisan antipathies within Kenyan society
(Barkan 2008; Chege 2008).
The post-election violence raised important ques-
tions regarding the effects of the pre-election civic
education program. The first concern was that the
violence might have erased whatever positive gains
were produced by NCEP II-Uraia. As noted, the
program sought to promote intercommunal tolerance
and to encourage the use of democratic means rather
than violence to resolve disputes. We speculated,
therefore, that the divisive effects of the conflict could
have undermined precisely the attitudes and behaviors
targeted by the civic education initiative. Second, it
may have been the case that those who had partici-
pated in NCEP might have reacted differently to the
violence itself than those who did not. Although the
program did not anticipate the conflict, one measure
of the program’s success would be that participants
who were directly affected by the violence would be
less likely to ‘‘backslide’’ away from supportive dem-
ocratic attitudes and values than those affected by the
violence in the control group. We speculated, in other
words, that the program might have ‘‘inoculated’’
participants in important ways against the negative




We explore the impact of the NCEP II-Uraia pro-
gram through an analysis of a survey of 3,600
individuals conducted across the country between
December 2008 and January 2009. The survey was
conducted as part of an overall evaluation of the
NCEP II-Uraia program that was commissioned by
the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment in September 2008.5 1,800 individuals who had
been exposed to NCEP II-Uraia face-to-face activities
were interviewed by survey teams from the Nairobi-
based firm Research International as the ‘‘treatment
group’’ sample, along with 1,800 ‘‘control group’’
individuals who were similar to the treatment group
but who had no NCEP II-Uraia face-to-face expo-
sure. Treatment group individuals were selected
based on a two-stage, random-sampling process
(described more fully in the supplemental appendix
available at http://journals.cambridge.org/jop): a ran-
dom sample of 360 NCEP II-Uraia activities was first
selected based on so-called ‘‘Form D’’ cover sheets
that facilitators were required to complete after each
activity and file with the NCEP II-Uraia central offices;
five specific treatment-group respondents were then
interviewed based on a random sampling of households
in the areas where the selected activities took place.
Finally, a detailed procedure was implemented to inter-
view five control-group individuals from those same
areas, and who were matched to the treatment-group
individuals on a series of demographic characteristics,
including education, age, gender, and membership in
civil society organizations. These procedures, along with
additional statistical matching of the treatment and
control groups that we introduce at the analysis phase,
give us as much confidence as possible—given the4The Afrobarometer Round 4 survey (N=1, 104), which was
conducted in October—November 2008, found that approxi-
mately 24% of respondents had been directly affected through
loss of personal property, destruction of a home or business,
personal injury, or the death of a family member.
5The evaluation was implemented through the Washington D.C.-
based firm Management Systems International.
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inherent limitations of the data that we will discuss
below—that the observed differences between the
groups can be attributed to NCEP II-Uraia exposure.
Several methodological issues should be noted at
the outset. First, in contrast to the previous NCEP I
assessment (Finkel and Smith 2011), the current
study does not contain a ‘‘pretest’’ component. That
is, we do not have baseline data on individuals’
democratic orientations before the NCEP II-Uraia
activities took place. This means that, with only cross-
sectional data at our disposal, we face even greater
difficulties in ruling out the possibility that individuals
in the treatment group were already different on
democratic outcomes, or different on factors relevant
to changes in democratic outcomes, before their ex-
posure to NCEP II-Uraia civic education. Second, the
events following the 2007 election prevented the study
from being implemented until over a year after the end
of the program itself. As noted above, the study was only
formally commissioned in September 2008, some nine
months after the election and the violence that took
place in the election’s aftermath. This means that the
study represents an assessment only of the longer-term
impact of the NCEP II-Uraia program on individuals,
as we were unable to observe individuals at or around
the time that the NCEP II-Uraia interventions took
place. Third, the study by necessity relies on individ-
uals’ recollection of activities that took place many
months before they were interviewed; moreover, we
had neither names nor contact information for specific
individuals who had attended. This necessitated the
institution of relatively elaborate procedures during
the sampling stage to verify the status (treatment
versus control) of individuals who were contacted by
Research International. We believe the procedures
were implemented successfully by the survey teams,
but nevertheless there is likely to have been some error




A detailed description of the sampling and respondent
selection procedures can be found in the supplemental
appendix. We summarize the procedures here.
We sampled at random 90 activities conducted in
2007 by each of the four NCEP-II consortia for
inclusion in the study. These activities comprised
targeted workshops, poetry-drama events, and infor-
mal meetings, with the numbers of each drawn in
proportion to the total activities of each type under-
taken by the particular Consortium. Research Interna-
tional then sent survey teams to the exact venue (such
as a school or marketplace) where each of the 360
sampled activities took place and searched for re-
spondents following random route procedures.
Interview teams started at the exact venue where
each of the 360 sampled NCEP II-Uraia activities took
place and contacted households following a random
walk procedure. A detailed set of screening questions
was asked of all potential respondents, and if a given
respondent reported attending at least one civic edu-
cation activity before the 2007 election, the individual
was selected for inclusion in the ‘‘treatment group.’’6
Once a treatment-group respondent interview had
been successfully completed, the interviewer recorded
that person’s demographic information in terms of
gender, age, education, and the number of secondary
group memberships to which the person belonged.
Interviewers were then instructed to find control-group
individuals, using random-route procedures starting
some distance from the treatment-group respondent’s
location, who had similar demographic characteristics
as the given treatment-group individual but who had
not attended Uraia civic education activities before the
2007 election. This set of procedures was repeated until
five treatment-group respondents and five matching
control-group respondents were interviewed from
each of the 360 sampling points, resulting in 1,800
treatment-group respondents and 1,800 matched con-
trol-group respondents.
Survey Instrument
A detailed list of all variables used, their exact question
wordings and response categories, and, where appro-
priate, scale reliability coefficients, can be found in the
supplemental appendix. The survey instrument in-
cluded questions relating to the general themes of the
Uraia program: good governance, human rights, de-
mocracy, constitutionalism, and nation building. For
some of these dimensions, the questions relate to
individuals’ awareness, involvement, or perceived compe-
tence regarding an issue or theme, and we categorize
these items under the general rubric of Civic Competence
and Engagement. For other dimensions, the questions
6The exact English wording to define ‘‘civic education activities’’
for the respondent in the screening questions was: ‘‘As you may
know, there are some programs going on in Kenya that try to
engage people about democracy and human rights and about
how to solve community problems. Sometimes they are spon-
sored by community organizations or religious organizations,
and they can involve workshops, public barazas, theatre or drama
presentations, town meetings, or other kinds of public discus-
sions in churches or mosques about citizens’ rights and respon-
sibilities. We call these kinds of activities ‘‘civic education.’’
56 steven e. finkel, jeremy horowitz, and reynaldo t. rojo-mendoza
related to individuals’ preferences or values about
politics, the rights of citizens, leaders, institutions, or
the overall political system, and we categorize these
items under the general rubric of Democratic Values,
Rights, and Responsibilities. Finally, the survey included
a range of questions on Ethnic Social and Political
relations, taking into account the polarized conditions
following the intercommunal violence that occurred
after Kenya’s 2007 election.7
Statistical Procedures
The main obstacle in estimating the casual effect of
exposure to the NCEP II-Uraia program, as is the case
in nearly all observational assessments of development
programs, is the potential for selection bias. Because
Kenyan citizens freely chose whether to participate in
the program (as opposed to being randomly assigned
to treatment conditions in experimental research), it is
likely that many differences—both observable and
unobservable—exist between participants and non-
participants that may also be associated with differ-
ences on political knowledge, participation, and other
dependent variables. To address these concerns, we
employ a fourfold approach. First, as described in the
previous section, we developed a matching protocol
for the sampling stage in which each respondent who
reported having participated in NCEP II-Uraia was
carefully matched on place of residence, age, gender,
education, and group memberships with a respondent
who had not participated. This ensured that the
control and treatment groups were well balanced on
several important demographic variables.8
Second, we supplemented this sampling-based
matching with additional balancing of the treatment
and control groups before the estimation stage, using
the CEM (Coarsened Exact Matching) methods de-
veloped by Ho et al. (2007) and Iacus, King, and
Porro (2011).9 We matched on a range of factors
(age, income, church attendance, group membership,
and whether respondents had ever served as a leader
of any group or association to which they belonged)
that might be related to both NCEP II-Uraia partic-
ipation and democratic orientations.10 The CEM
matching procedure produces different ‘‘bins’’ or strata
consisting of the combinations of characteristics in the
specified variables (e.g., leaders with high church
attendance, medium income, young age) and then
balances the treatment and control groups as com-
pletely as possible by eliminating treatment group cases
that have no corresponding control-group member in
their ‘‘bins,’’ and eliminating control-group cases that
have no corresponding treatment group member in
their ‘‘bins’’ as well. In our case, this procedure
eliminated 611 individuals in the original treatment
group, and 197 members of the original control group.
Table SA-3 in the supplemental appendix reports
the degree of imbalance between the treatment and
control groups on a number of covariates before and
after the CEM matching. The table shows that,
despite the rough matching procedures used at the
sampling stage, statistically significant differences
remained on some variables, including age and
income. And relatively large differences between the
groups exist in the pre-CEM columns for group
leadership, membership in parties or civic groups,
and in the motivational and media exposure factors.
Once the CEM balancing procedures were imple-
mented, the groups were nearly perfectly balanced
(i.e., had identical mean values) on all the demographic
covariates, including many (such as marital and
employment status) that were not explicitly entered
into CEM. These procedures do much to ensure that
observed differences between the treatment and control
groups are not the result of pretreatment differences
between the groups on demographic factors measured
in the study.
Nevertheless, it can be seen that even after imple-
menting the CEM matching procedure, significant
differences still exist between the CEM-balanced treat-
ment and control groups on motivational factors such
as political interest and discussion, on general media
exposure and exposure to specific NCEP II-Uraia
media presentations, and on membership in political
parties and civic organizations. This presents a difficult
choice for assessing the causal impacts of face-to-face
NCEP II-Uraia activities. To the extent that civic
education exposure led individuals, for example, to
become more interested in politics, or to attend to
7The questionnaire was translated into Kiswahili by members of
the Research International staff and back-translated by a pro-
fessional translator in Nairobi: 67% of the interviews were
conducted in Kiswahili, 26% were conducted in English, and
7% were carried out in one of Kenya’s other languages.
8Because treatment and control individuals were sampled from
the same communities, the possibility of spillover effects is a
concern. While we cannot eliminate this issue in our statistical
tests, we note that spillover would likely bias our tests toward the
null hypothesis, making it more difficult to find statistically
significant program effects.
9As opposed to other matching techniques, CEM balances treat-
ment and control groups before (parametric) estimation and,
therefore, bounds the degree to which results from subsequent
estimation are dependent on modeling assumptions and specifi-
cations (Ho et al. 2007).
10We further eliminated any respondent who reported attending
civic education activities after the 2007 elections.
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media (or NCEP II-Uraia media) messages more
frequently, or to join a civic group, then controlling
for, or balancing, these ‘‘posttreatment’’ variables will
result in an attenuation of the estimated causal effects
of interest. On the other hand, it is likely that at least
part of the differences between treatment and control
individuals on these variables reflects preexisting differ-
ences in motivation and chronic exposure to political
information between the two groups. Variables such as
interest, discussion and media exposure may further
serve as partial proxies for unobservable factors such as
an intrinsic ‘‘taste’’ for politics or more democratic
personality characteristics that may differ between the
treatment and control groups and thus confound the
causal inference process as well. On balance (no pun
intended), we decided as a third strategy to include
these motivational and media exposure variables, as
well as reported membership in civic organizations
and political parties, as additional controls in CEM-
weighted regression models predicting each democratic
orientation along with treatment/control-group status.
This procedure may result in our underestimating the
impact of NCEP II-Uraia exposure. Nevertheless, we
include these variables in a conservative attempt to
capture some of the political and motivational differ-
ences between the treatment and control groups that
may produce spurious causal estimates.11
Our fourth strategy for dealing with the potential
problem of selection bias is to conduct a sensitivity
analysis for ‘‘hidden bias’’ in the estimates due to the
potential effects of unobservable factors that may differ-
entiate the treatment and control groups. This method,
developed by Rosenbaum (2002), calculates bounds on
the magnitude of an effect that an unobserved covariate
would have to have on the selection process in order
to overturn the inferences about treatment effects that
we report. This effect can then be compared to the
magnitude of effects that the observed variables actually
have on selection, in order to assess the plausibility that
treatment effects are due to unobservable factors.
Recent political science applications of the method
can be found in Ladd and Lenz (2009) and Stein and
Vonnahme (2008).
To estimate treatment effects, we ran separate OLS
regressions for each dependent variable described in
the previous section. All models use the post-CEM
balanced data and include whether the respondent had
attended an NCEP II-Uraia face-to-face activity, along
with the following controls: age group, gender, edu-
cation level, income level, frequency of church attend-
ance, a measure of group membership, whether the
respondent belongs to a political party or a civic
organization, whether respondent has ever been a
leader of any group to which he/she belongs, media
consumption, political interest, a measure of political
participation, and exposure to the NCEP II-Uraia
media campaign. We also include a dummy variable
or fixed effect for each of the 360 sampling points in
the study and cluster standard errors by the specific
matched treatment-control respondent pairs within
each sampling point.
Basic Results
Table 1 presents our core findings from regression
models predicting each of the dependent variables
described above. To facilitate comparison of the
magnitude of effects across these variables, we also
show ‘‘Y-standardized’’ coefficients, which were calcu-
lated by dividing the regression coefficient for each
dependent variable by the standard deviation of the
variable.
The results show that NCEP II-Uraia had the
most consistent effects on Civic Competence and
Engagement variables and more limited effects on
Democratic Values and Orientations or Identity and
Ethnic Group Relations. Program participants
scored higher both on objective measures of political
knowledge (general knowledge) and perceived knowl-
edge of Kenya’s political system (perceived knowledge
of the constitution) and their basic rights as citizens
(informed about protecting rights). Participants also
expressed greater confidence in their ability to influ-
ence political outcomes (internal efficacy). These effects
were moderate in substantive terms, with standardized
effects in some cases in the .15-.20 range. Given the
long time period that had elapsed since individuals
experienced the NCEP II-Uraia activities, this is rela-
tively impressive evidence regarding the durability of
civic education’s impact, at least on this cluster of
variables. The program had mixed effects on partic-
ipation, leading to higher levels of participation at the
local level but not at the national level. We suspect that
the difference can be attributed to the program’s
greater focus on local-level politics and perhaps also
the nature of the Kenyan political system, which offers
few avenues for citizens to engage national-level
institutions.
On the cluster of variables related to Democratic
Values, Rights, and Responsibilities, we observe only
11A further robustness check incorporates these variables into the
CEM matching procedure itself, as we discuss below and in
supplemental appendix Table SA-4.
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scattered effects. The program had no effect on basic
orientations toward democracy or support for the
rule of law (democracy is best, support for rule of law).
Effects were seen, however, on two variables related
to more quotidian aspects of electoral politics in the
Kenyan context, rejection of vote buying and opposi-
tion to the use of violence. We suspect that in emerging
democracies like Kenya, where citizens often have
good reason to be skeptical about national-level
political institutions, civic education programs face
greater difficulty in influencing citizen orientations
toward broad concepts like democracy or the rule of
law, relative to the more immediate issues that have
greater bearing on the citizens’ interaction with the
political process. On human rights, we find that the
program had a small positive effect on support for a
bundle of basic human and political rights (rights
consciousness), but was not effective in regard to
women’s rights (support for women’s rights).
Similarly, we find mixed results on variables
related to Identity and Ethnic Group Relations. The
program led to significant increases in the amount of
social tolerance that individuals are willing to extend
to their ‘‘most disliked group’’ and led to significant
increases in the perception that violence is not an
appropriate means for ethnic groups to defend them-
selves if they feel threatened. The program was less
effective regarding questions of national belonging or
ethnic political tolerance. Given the centrality of these
outcomes to the program’s goals, we conclude that the
modest observed effects are indicative of a mixed
record—while some positive changes were observed,
no movement was seen on other key variables. It
should be noted, moreover, that none of the observed
effects for Democratic Values or Ethnic Orientations
were large in terms of their substantive magnitude.
The standardized effects for these variables were all
below .10, well below the values registered for the
variables in the civic competence and engagement
cluster. All of this suggests that NCEP-II Uraia was a
relatively effective long-term agent of political empow-
erment, but a much less effective long-term agent for
value change.
We report a series of additional robustness and
sensitivity checks on these findings in the supple-
mental appendix. Table SA-4 shows that the results
are robust to several alternative procedures for
matching treatment and control-group respondents:
one that adds possible posttreatment outcomes such
as political interest, media exposure, and political
discussion into the set of matching variables in the
CEM procedure, and another that uses propensity




I. Civic Competence and Engagement
Political Knowledge .19** (.05) .14** .45
Perceived Knowledge of Constitution .13** (.02) .20** .31
Informed about Protecting Rights .10** (.02) .15** .28
Internal Efficacy .12** (.04) .11** .31
Local Political Participation .10** (.04) .07** .42
National Political Participation .03 (.02) .04 .36
II. Democratic Values, Rights, and Responsibilities
Democracy is Best .02 (.02) .04 .20
Support for Rule of Law .04 (.04) .04 .27
Rejection of Vote Buying .05** (.02) .08** .34
Opposition to the Use of Violence .05* (.03) .06* .34
Rights Consciousness .02** (.01) .07** .38
Support for Women’s Rights .04 (.03) .05 .36
III. Identity and Ethnic Group Relations
National versus Ethnic Identity .03 (.03) .04 .26
Most-Disliked Ethnic Group Political Tolerance -.01 (.04) -.01 .39
Most-Disliked Ethnic Group Social Tolerance .11** (.04) .09** .37
Opposition to Violence as Ethnic Defense .08** (.03) .09** .33
Results from CEM-weighted regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses.
N ranges from 2670 to 2783.
** p , .05 (two-tailed); * p , .10 (two-tailed)
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score matching techniques, with the entire set of
control variables (both pretreatment and possible post-
treatment covariates) as predictors of the likelihood of
NCEP II-Uraia civic education exposure. In both tests
the effects of all five of the competence and engagement
variables remain significant and of comparable (and
in some cases larger) magnitude as is reported in
Table 1. Two of the ‘‘democratic values and identity’’
variables—rejection of vote buying and opposition to
violence as an ethnic defense—also retain their strength
and significance, while only the smaller effects observed
in Table 1 for rights consciousness, opposition to
political violence and ethnic social tolerance are more
sensitive to the exact matching method and specifica-
tion of the selection model.
Finally, we show in Table SA-5 that the results are
robust to reasonable amounts of possible ‘‘hidden
bias’’ from unobserved variables that may influence
both selection into treatment and the outcomes re-
ported in Table 1. Following the Rosenbaum bounds
method (DiPrete and Gangl 2004; Rosenbaum 2002),
we estimate that in order for an unobserved factor to
alter the inferences about treatment effects we have
made, it would have to be of sufficient magnitude to
have increased the odds of receiving treatment for
one person in a pair of otherwise (propensity-score)
matched individuals by factors ranging from a high of
2.40 (in the case of opposition to violence as ethnic
defense) to a low of 1.13 (for internal efficacy). Six of
the eight variables register factors of 1.30 or above,
indicating that the hidden bias would need to be
associated with at least a 30% increase in the odds of
treatment for one member of an otherwise equally
(propensity-score) matched pair of individuals. Hid-
den bias of these magnitudes cannot be ruled out
entirely, though it seems implausible here, given the
size of selection effects we find for observed resource
and motivational factors such as income, interest,
media attentiveness, and political discussion. For
example, belonging to the highest versus lowest
category of interest, income, media attentiveness,
and political discussion increased the odds of receiv-
ing treatment by factors of 1.16, 1.17, 1.20, and 1.22,
respectively (see Table SA-6). This means that an
unobserved covariate would need to have influenced
selection into treatment over and above these observed
factors, and with equal or greater magnitudes in
nearly all cases to call our results into question. Even
the most powerful variables in our selection model,
belonging to a civic group and being a ‘‘leader’’ of a
secondary association, increase the odds of receiving
treatment by factors of 1.40 and 1.57, respectively; an
unobserved covariate would need to be uncorrelated
with, and have nearly equal or more powerful effects
than these variables in influencing treatment in half
of our eight cases to overturn our findings.12
The Impact of Post-Election
Violence
In this section we explore the ways that the violence
and dislocations that occurred in Kenya following
the disputed 2007 elections may have influenced the
effects of NCEP II-Uraia civic education. Because the
fieldwork for the evaluation took place after the post-
election violence had ended, we were able to inquire
about respondents’ personal experiences with the
post-election violence and disruptions and to deter-
mine whether and how such experiences may have
mitigated or otherwise influenced the impacts of pre-
election civic education. Such an exploration, as
discussed above, provides perhaps the first window
into the effects of civic education in an inhospitable
political context characterized by violence, acute
ethnic conflict, and democratic ‘‘backsliding.’’
One possibility is that the intercommunal violence
that followed the 2007 election might have attenuated,
or even erased, the positive effects of NCEP II-Uraia
civic education. If this were the case, we would observe
weaker effects in our sample than would have been the
case had we conducted the evaluation before the
violence occurred. Of course, we cannot directly test
for this, but we may provide some indirect evidence
for this claim by demonstrating smaller effects of
NCEP II-Uraia impact among individuals who were
personally affected by the violence than among those
who were not. Another, perhaps more positive possi-
bility, however, is that exposure to NCEP II-Uraia civic
education served in some ways to ‘‘inoculate’’ individ-
uals against some of the more deleterious effects of the
violence itself. That is, individuals who experienced
violence and who were exposed to civic education
may have been less likely to adopt negative attitudes
towards ethnic outgroups, lose faith in democratic
institutions and processes, or withdraw politically
12It should also be noted that the sensitivity analysis provides a
relatively conservative test of possible hidden bias. The unob-
served covariates are assumed not only to influence the odds of
receiving treatment for one person in an otherwise propensity-
score matched pair of individuals with the magnitude described
above, but also to be related to the dependent variables so
strongly as to predict perfectly which of the two individuals ranks
higher than the other on the outcomes (DiPrete and Gangl 2004).
The method will thus find bias even if the unobservables’ effects
on the dependent variable are weaker than assumed in the test.
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than individuals who experienced violence in the
control group.
To test for these possibilities, we asked individuals
whether ‘‘you or your family was affected by the violence
that occurred after the 2007 election.’’ 27.2% of the
(CEM-balanced) treatment and 26.6% of the (CEM-
balanced) control group reported that they had been
affected. We entered this variable (Violence) into a series
of regression models predicting core democratic and
other ethnic-related orientations, along with the inter-
action between Violence and NCEP II-Uraia treatment
exposure. The signs and magnitudes of the various
terms in the model allow us to assess how civic
education and the experience of post-election violence
may have influenced attitudes about democracy. In
addition to the core democratic variables from the
previous section’s analyses, we include two additional
ethnic or violence-related measures (neither of which
were significant in simple treatment effects models):
whether the individual believes that ‘‘it is sometimes
necessary to use violence to avenge past wrongs com-
mitted against your family or ethnic community’’; and
the extent to which the individual has ‘‘forgiven those
responsible for the post-election ethnic violence.’’
Table 2 shows the results of the analysis. We
present in the first column the estimated effect for
treatment exposure, which, in the context of these
models, indicates the impact of NCEP II-Uraia ex-
posure among individuals who did not experience
post-election violence. The second column shows the
estimated effect of Violence, which indicates the impact
of post-election violence experiences among individu-
als who were not exposed to NCEP II-Uraia activities.
The third column presents the estimated interaction
effect: the additional impact of NCEP II-Uraia ex-
posure for those who experienced post-election vio-
lence, or, alternatively, the additional impact of the
experience of post-election violence among individuals
in the treatment group.
We see little support for the hypothesis that the
violence reduced the impact of NCEP II-Uraia
activities among those individuals who participated.
For the Civic Competence and Engagement variables,
we see that the treatment effect remains strong
and significant, with very little influence of political
violence on the process. Individuals who experienced
violence were not significantly different on these
dimensions than those who did not, and the inter-
action terms, aside from that seen in the internal
efficacy model, are very close to zero.
For Democratic Values and Ethnic Orientations,
it is also the case that the experience of post-election
violence did not reduce the impact of NCEP II-Uraia
exposure. In no case is the interaction effect between
Violence and Treatment negative, indicating that the
effect of treatment is never less for those who experi-
enced violence than for those who did not. In fact,
on several key variables, there are positive interac-
tions between Violence and Treatment, such that the
effects of NCEP II-Uraia exposure are stronger among
treatment-group respondents who were directly af-
fected by the violence compared with treatment-group
respondents who were not.
The impact of NCEP II-Uraia exposure was, for
example, nearly zero on attitudes towards the rule of
law, opposition to political violence, and forgiveness of
those who perpetrated violence if treated individuals
did not personally experience post-election violence,
while the effects are in the .13 to .15 range (and
statistically significant) among treated individuals who
experienced the upheavals directly.13 For ethnic group
social tolerance, the effect of NCEP II-Uraia exposure is
more than double in size for directly affected treat-
ment-group respondents (.18 (.08+.10) compared to
.08). This is an intriguing pattern, suggesting that NCEP
II-Uraia activities had longer-lasting impact on many
ethnic and violence-related attitudes among those in-
dividuals who personally experienced the upheavals
following the 2007 election.
An alternative way to interpret this pattern is to
note that the experience of violence among individuals
in the control group had negative effects on nearly all of
the ethnic and violence-related orientations, with several
of these effects reaching statistical significance. Among
the control group, the personal experience of post-
election violence is significantly associated with less
opposition to political violence, less opposition to the
use of violence for ethnic defense, and less likelihood of
having forgiven the perpetrators of the 2007–08 violence
and ethnic conflict. Negative (though insignificant)
effects for violence among the control are also observed
for support for the rule of law and opposition to
violence in order to ‘‘avenge past wrongs.’’ In all but
one of these cases, the effects of personal experience
with violence are essentially reduced to zero (and
statistical insignificance) among individuals in the treat-
ment group.14 This lends relatively consistent support
13These effects are the sum of the coefficients in the ‘‘treatment’’
and ‘‘interaction’’ columns of the table; the treatment column
provides the treatment effect for individuals not experiencing
violence, with the interaction column providing the additional
increment for treated individuals who did experience post-
election violence.
14We show a full table with the effects of personal experience of
violence for the control group and the treatment group sepa-
rately, along with conditional standard errors, as Table SA-7 in
the supplemental appendix.
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to the ‘‘inoculation’’ hypothesis put forward above, as
exposure to NCEP II-Uraia civic education activities in
effect blunted the deleterious negative impacts that the
individual’s personal experience with post-election vio-
lence had on ethnic-related political and democratic
attitudes.
This interpretation is further strengthened when
we examine responses to the final set of questions we
asked concerning the traumatic events following the
2007 election. We asked respondents to ‘‘Please
think about the time right before the December
2007 elections, that is, before all the violence and
dislocations that occurred in Kenya,’’ and then
asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following
statements:
d At that time I thought that democracy was a better
system of government than I do now.
d At that time I thought I could influence the
political process more than I do now.
d At that time I was more willing to consider the
views of people from other ethnic groups than I am
now.
d At that time I was more optimistic about building a
true democracy in Kenya than I am now.
Positive responses on these items mean that the
impact of the post-election upheavals caused indi-
viduals to become less optimistic about Kenyan
democracy, their roles in it, and their consideration
of other ethnic groups’ points of view. The overall
responses to these questions are revealing, in that
between 61% and 70% of all respondents ‘‘agree’’ or
‘‘strongly agree’’ with each of the statements.
We show in Table 3 the effect of the direct
experience of post-election violence on each of these
orientations, among individuals who were treated in
NCEP II-Uraia civic education activities and individ-
uals who were not. It can be seen that on three of
these dimensions, Perceived Influence, Consider
Other Ethnic Views, and Optimism about Kenyan
Democracy, the effect of personal experience with
violence had strongly positive effects on these varia-
bles only among the control group. That is, people in
the control group who directly experienced post-
election violence became more pessimistic about
their Kenyan democracy and their role in it, and less
willing to consider the views of other ethnic groups,
while no such negative impact occurred among the
treatment group. Thus we conclude that the NCEP
II-Uraia program had some role in mitigating the
negative impacts of the traumatic events of the post-
election period and in mitigating some of the
democratic ‘‘backsliding’’ that occurred in the elec-
tion’s aftermath.
TABLE 2 The Effects of Post-Election Violence and NCEP II-Uraia Exposure on Civic Competence,
Democratic Values, and Ethnic Orientations
Treatment Violence Interaction Adj-R2
Civic Competence and Engagement
Political Knowledge .18** (.05) .01 (.09) .01 (.10) .45
Internal Efficacy .10** (.05) -.09 (.07) .10 (.09) .31
Local Political Participation .11** (.05) .11 (.08) -.02 (.11) .42
Informed about How to Protect Rights .09** (.03) -.05 (.04) .00 (.06) .28
Democratic Values and Ethnic Orientations
Democracy is Best .00 (.02) -.04 (.03) .04 (.04) .20
Support for Rule of Law .00 (.05) -.12 (.08) .14 (.10) .27
Opposition to the Use of Violence .02 (.04) -.12* (.06) .13* (.08) .34
Opposition to Violence as Ethnic Defense .08** (.04) -.15** (.06) .01 (.08) .33
Opposition to Violence to Avenge
Past Wrongs
.00 (.04) -.08 (.06) .07 (.07) .33
Most-Disliked Ethnic Group
Political Tolerance
-.02 (.04) .10 (.08) .02 (.10) .39
Most-Disliked Ethnic Group
Social Tolerance
.08* (.05) .01 (.07) .10 (.10) .37
Forgive those who Perpetrated Violence? .01 (.03) -.10* (.05) .07 (.06) .31
Results from CEM-weighted regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses.
N ranges from 2676 to 2778.
** p , .05 (two-tailed); * p , .10 (two-tailed)
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Conclusions
We explored two previously unexamined questions
related to civic education programs: whether such
programs have long-term effects and whether they
can be effective in the context of democratic back-
sliding. Our results provide evidence that large-scale
civic education programs can produce relatively long-
term effects, adding to a growing number of evalua-
tions from other settings that report similar findings.
As in previous research, however, the strongest
evidence of long-term impact was found on variables
related to civic competence and engagement, with
only sporadic and relatively small effects found on
most variables related to democratic values. This
supports an emerging pattern in civic education
evaluation research, that donor-sponsored education
programs can be relatively effective agents of political
empowerment, but are typically much less effective
agents of value change.
One important exception to this generalization is
perhaps the most surprising finding that emerges
from the analysis. We found that NCEP II-Uraia
exposure had some ‘‘inoculation effects’’ related to
the post-election violence that erupted in Kenya
shortly after the program ended. Specifically, we
found that participants in the program who subse-
quently were affected by the post-election violence
were less likely (relative to nonparticipants who were
affected by the violence) to adopt negative views on a
range of important variables related to ethnic rela-
tions, tolerance, and conflict resolution (see also
Paluck and Green 2009). Participants were less likely
to express support for the use of political and ethnic
violence, more likely to have forgiven those respon-
sible for the post-election violence, and more likely to
develop generalized support for the rule of law These
intriguing results imply that civic education has the
potential to reduce at least some of the negative
effects of democratic backsliding and that the neg-
ative impact of the post-2007 election aftermath in
Kenya would have been greater in the absence of the
NCEP II-Uraia program.
The findings have additional implications for
the future implementation and evaluation of donor-
sponsored civic education programs. First, the limits
of civic education in influencing core democratic
values need to be taken more seriously in the design
and implementation phases of future programs. The
results here confirm that mere exposure to civic
education is typically not enough to produce substan-
tial gains in tolerance, support for the rule of law, or
other important democratic values in either the long
or the short term. But this is to not to say that in-
fluencing these orientations is impossible. Rather, we
support the findings from previous research (e.g.,
Campbell 2008; Finkel 2003) that changing core
democratic values requires frequent, focused training
TABLE 3 The Effects of Post-Election Violence on Disillusionment with Kenyan Democracy among NCEP
II-Uraia Participants and Control Group
Estimated Effect of Experience
with Violence among the
Control Group
Estimated Effect of Experience







I thought Democracy was a
Better Form of
Government
.07 (.08) .06 .14* (.08) .12* .39
I thought I could Influence
Politics More Then
Than Now
.24** (.09) .19** .09 (.09) .07 .29
I was More Willing to
Consider the Views of
Other Ethnic Groups
.16* (.08) .12** .02 (.09) .01 .34
I was More Optimistic about
Kenyan Democracy
.16** (.07) .12** .06 (.08) .04 .37
Results from CEM regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses.
N is 2777 for the first reported regression and 2778 for the rest.
** p , .05 (two-tailed); * p , .10 (two-tailed)
civic education and democratic backsliding 63
with active, participatory teaching methodologies and
with high-quality instructors. These are issues that
need to be built into program design, yet all too often
are not. NCEP II-Uraia, for example, adopted a highly
diffuse strategy, seeking to affect a very wide range of
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors rather than a more
limited but focused strategy. Moreover, the vast majority
of NCEP II-Uraia activities were relatively short in
duration, with some being only a few hours or less, and
this was simply not sufficient time to impart the kind of
information needed to bring about meaningful value
change. A more intensive approach focused on a nar-
rower range of outcomes would have been substantially
more effective, and we urge future programs to adopt
these design features to maximize individual-level impact.
Second, our findings suggest a complex relation-
ship between political context and civic education
impact that future research needs to explore more
fully. The results here indicate that, perhaps contrary
to expectations, civic education can be a useful ap-
proach in countries experiencing democratic reversals,
and not simply in countries that are making steady
progress toward the consolidation of democracy. In-
deed, our results suggest that civic education actually
was able to counteract some of the negative effects of
violence, instability, and institutional failure in the
Kenyan context. But there are likely to be limits to these
processes. Despite the ‘‘backsliding’’ that Kenya expe-
rienced around the time of the 2007 election and
thereafter, the country was still in far better democratic
shape than it had been only a decade or so before and
was in far better shape than many autocracies and
nondemocracies around the world as well. The impact
of civic education in more chronically inhospitable
contexts is still very much an open question. As more
evaluations of civic education (and other donor-
sponsored democracy assistance) programs are con-
ducted in more varied political and social contexts, the
interactions between the political environment and the
microlevel effectiveness of these democratic interven-
tions will come into greater focus.
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